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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsAL&~

Case No. 16973

DOUGLAS ASAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with theft, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1) (a) (i)

(1953, as

amended) .
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by the unanimous verdict
of a jury before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, in the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of
Utah, on February 11, 1980.

Appellant was sentenced for the

term provided by law, but the sentence was suspended and
appellant allowed probation upon payment of a $5000.00 fine
and restitution, all to be paid within one year, at which
time, the probation will terminate.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's
verdict and sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of July 10, 1979, Eric Rasmussen
drove into Salt Lake City to see a movie.

He parked and

left his car at approximately 8:00-8:30 p.m.

(T. 95).

At

approximately 10:30 p.m., Mr. Rasmussen returned to find
that his car was missing (T. 31).

About one hour later,

Wayne Pasco observed two vehicles pull up in front of his
home.

The first car was left in his gateway and its driver

got into the second car.

This car proceeded down the b+ock

to a row of storage sheds where the two individuals unlocked
the gate and one of the storage shed doors.
followed them on his bicycle.

Mr. Pasco

The two individuals then

went back to the first car, drove it inside the unlocked
storage shed and "pulled the door down quickly behind the
car." (T. 50).

Although Mr. Pasco got within 20 or 30 feet

of the individuals, it was too dark for him to be able to
identify either of them (T. 51).
At approximately 1:00 p.m., on July 11, 1979, Mr.
Pasco observed that same storage shed door open just a couple
of feet with a truck parked across the opening.

This surprised

Mr. Pasco since it was a very hot, July day (T. 58).

-2-
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Responding

to Mr. Pasco's call, Sergeant Hollbrook, of the Davis Countv
Sheriff's Office, arrived in time to see appellant carry the
hood of a car out of the shed and place it in his truck (T.36).
The vehicle in the shed belonged to Eric Rasmussen (T.33).
Appellant told the Sergeant that he had purchased the vehicle
and had a bill of sale at home.

But when the Sergeant

suggested they go to appellant's home to see the bill of
sale, the appellant became very evasive (T. 38).

Sergeant

Hollbrook testified that "it became quite apparent that he
did not want us to" accompany appellant to his home (T.37).
When Deputy Leonard arrived at the scene, he attempted to
question appellant.

Although appellant was "uncooperative,"

he did state "that the vehicle was stolen." (T. 42).
At trial, appellant offered an explanation of his
possession of the stolen vehicle.

He testified that three

·weeks before July 10, 1979, he picked up two hitch-hikers
who said they would call appellant if they came across the
auto parts he was looking for in order to fix his sister's
damaged car.

On July 10, 1979, these hitch-hikers called

to tell appellant they had the parts to sell to him.

Since

appellant was going on a _date, he only had time to meet these
men in town and give them the key to his storage shed.
Appellant alleges that it was these two hitch-hikers who
were observed by Mr. Pasco (T. 68-70).

-3-
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This explanation, however, was shown to be inconsistent with the facts presented in court.

The hitch-hikers

allegedly called and said they had the parts at 6:00-6:30
p.m. on July 10, 1979 (T. 76).

But the stolen vehicle was

not out of the victim's possession until 8:00-8:30 p.m. that
night (T. 95).

Appellant had offered to purchase individual

auto parts, but the "hitch-hikers" delivered an operable
motor vehicle.

Appellant testified that the hitch-hikers

did not tell him their names, addresses or telephone numbers.
Also, they did not return to be paid for a vehicle worth in
excess of $1000.00.

Appellant lied to the police regarding

ownership of the vehicle (T. 37).

Appellant did not produce

his sister to corroborate her ownership of a wrecked mustang,

and failed to

pro~ce

any other evidence to prove this

assert~~

Appellant also testified that he thought he could

j

remove the parts he wanted because the car looked "beat up"
and like a "junk heap,"

(T. 77), and because the inside of

the car was a mess (T. 78).

But when shown photos of the car,

appellant admitted that it did not look "beat up."

(T. 78).

The mess appellant was referring to, included a camera, cassette
tapes and a check book lying on the floor of the car (T. 97).
During trial, appellant attempted to attack the
credibility of Deputy Leonard with a prior inconsistent
statement (T. 43).

The prosecution rehabilitated Deputy

Leonard's testimony with a prior statement, from a police
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-4- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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I

report made at the time of arrest, that was consistent
with his testimony at trial (T. 91).
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THE PRESUMPTION FOUND
IN § 76-6-402(1).

A
THE PRESUMPTION FOUND IN
§ 76-6-402(1) IS PERMISSIVE
NOT MANDATORY.
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1)
(1953, as amended), which states:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such
possession is made, shall be deemed prima
facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property.
when properly interpreted, requires that once a defendant
has offered an explanation of his possession, the prosecution
must prove that the explanation is unsatisfactory.
further argues that jury Instruction #8, given at

Appellant
tria~,

which

states in part:
You are further instructed that one who
is found to be in possession of property
recently stolen, may be found to be the
guilty person unless he gives a satisfactory
explanation of his possession thereof. (R.49)
is improper in that it fails to place the burden on the state
to prove the explanation unsatisfactory.
The threshold question is whether the presumption is

-5-
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permissive ·or mandatory.

This will be determined primarily

through examination of the 'jury instruction involved and'
if necessary, through interpretation of the statute.
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 158 n.16 (1979).
In Ulster, the United States Supreme Court said:
'.'.It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine
·the existence of an element of the crime - that is, an
'ultimate' or 'elemental' fact - from the existence of one
or more 'evidentiary' or 'basic' facts."

Id. at 156.

The

Court defined a mandatory presumption to be one in which the
trier of fact must find the elemental fact upon proof of
the .basic fact.

An illustrative example of a mandatory

presumption may be found in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 515 (1979), in which the jury was instructed: "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts."

The Court found that, without further

tion is one in which, upon proof of the the basic fact, the
trier of fact may, but is not required to, infer the elemental
fact.

Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, at 157 . .
Since the jury must accept a mandatory presumption,

and may base its verdict solely on that presumption, the
Supreme Court said that in order to be constitutionally valid,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the mandatory presumption must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.

A permissive presumption, however, may be accepted

or rejected by the trier of fact.

It is just one of the many

pieces of evidence presented at trial, all of which are to
be weighed in determining guilt.

Therefore, a permissive

presumption need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to be constitutionally valid.
In Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, at 173, the
jury was instructed" . . . upon proof of the presence of . .
. the handweapons,

[in the automobile], you may infer and

draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed
by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the
time when such instruments were found . . . "

(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court found this to be a permissive presumption.
Id. at 160-61.
In the instant case, the jury was instructed:
" . . . one found to be in possession of property recently
stolen, may be found to be the guilty person . . . " (R. 49),
(emphasis added).

Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth

Edition, defines mandatory as "containing a command," Id. at

1114, and permissive as "that which may be done," Id. at 1298
(emphasis added).

A reasonable juror would have no difficulty

in discerning the permissive nature of Instruction #8.

An examination of Utah Code Ann.

-7-
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76-6-402(1)

(1953,
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as amended) , confirms the conclusion that this is a permissive
presumption.

The instruction challenged in Ulster, -included

verbatim, N.Y. Penal Law§ 265.15(3)

(McKinney's 1976-77 Supp.)

which states: "(3)

~he

any firearm,

is presumptive evidence of its possession

•

presence in an automobile, . • . of

:qy all persons occupying such automobile at the time s_uch
-weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except . • .
( empha-sis added) .

11

As previously stated, this instruction

was found to be constitutionally valid.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1)

(1953, as amended),

states: "(l) possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession
stole the property,"

(emphasfs added).

Although there is a

technical difference between "presumptive evidence" and
"prima facie evidence,"

they are often used interchangeably

and are intended to convey the same idea.

Watson v. Rollins,

9 0 · So . 6 0 , 61 (Al a . 19 21) ; St ate V . Ramsd e 11 , 4 5 N • W. 2d 5 0 3 ,
507 (Iowa 1951); State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 12 A. 794,
795 (Me. 1888); State v. Simon, 203 N.W. 989, 990 (Minn. 1925);
State v. Mitchell, 25 S.E. 783, 784 (N.C. 1896); Fightmaster
v. Mode, 167 N.S. 407, 412 (Ohio 1928).

The Utah statute

was intended to and does create a permissive presumption.
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B

THE PERMISSIVE PRESUMPTION
IS VALID BECAUSE THE PRESUMED
FACT IS MORE LIKELY THAN NOT
TO FLOW FROM THE BASIC FACT.
The test for whether a permissive presumption
comports with the due process clause, is whether "there is
a 'rational connection' between the basic facts that the
prosecution proved and the ultimate facts presumed, and that
the latter is 'more likely than not to flow from' the former."
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979).

See

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969); Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
In McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520 (1912), the
petitioner contended that his possession of recently stolen

I·

property did not support the conclusion that he committed
the burglary.

The Supreme Court said:

The evidence pointed to the appellant as one
having control of the car and engaged in theendeavor to secure the fruits of the burglarious
entry. Possession in these circumstances tended
to show guilty participation in the burglary.
This is but to accord to the evidence, if
unexplained, its natural probative force.
(Citations omitted) Id. at 524-525.
In State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 133, 499 P.2d
276, 279 (1972), this Court said that the presumption arising
from possession of recently stolen property is just "a
codification of a natural process of deductive reasoning."

-9-
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This Court has repeatedly upheld convictions based on this
permissive presumption.

E.g., State v. Sessions, 58.3 P.2d

44 (Utah 1978); State v. Gonzales, 30 Utah 2d 302, 517 P.2d
547 (1973); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952).

c
A PERMISSIVE PRESUMPTION DOES
NOT SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO THE DEFENDANT.
It is clear that the prosecution must prove all
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Windship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

In re

Appellant contends that

Instruction #8 required him to prove his explanation satisfactory, rather than force the prosecution to prove the
explanation unsatisfactory.

Appellant has failed to distin-

guish between the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion.
In Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973),
the jury was instructed that possession of recently stolen
property, if not satisfactorily explained, allows for the
inference that the person in possession knew the property
had been stolen.

The Supreme Court said:

It is true that the practical effect of
instructing the jury on the inference
arising from unexplained possession of
recently stolen property is to shift the
burden of going forward with evidence to
the defendant.
If the Government proves
possession and nothing more, this evidence
remains unexplained unless the defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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introduces evidence, since ordinarily
the Government's evidence will not
provide an explanation of possession
consistent with innocence . . . [and]
. . • where there is a 'rational connection' between the facts proved and the
fact presumed or inferred, it is
permissible to shift the burden of
going forward to the defendant.
Id. at 846 n. 11, (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged this in
State v. Kirkman, 20 Utah 2d 44, 46, 432 P.2d 638, 639 (1967),
in which it said:
There would be a duty upon the one in
possession of such property to explain
his possession if he is to remove that
adverse inference against him pointing
toward his guilt; and if he gives a
false account of how he acquired that
possession, or having a reasonable
opportunity to show that his possession
was honestly acquired he refuses or
fails to do so, such conduct is a
circumstance which may be considered by
the jury along with all other evidence
bearing upon the case in determining
guilt or innocence.
Accord, State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 15, 492 P.2d

97~,

979

(1972); State v. Little, 5 Utah 2d 42, 44, 296 P.2d 289, 291
(1956).

This Court has frequently rejected the contention

that the statutory presumption places an unconstitutional
burden on the defendant.

E.g., State v. Smelser, 23 Utah 2.d

347, 350, 463 P.2d 562, 565 (1970); State v. Little, supra;
State v. wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 37, 268 P.2d 998, 1000 (1954).

-11-
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And in Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979),
the Supreme Court said that a permissive presumption "does
not shift the burden of proof."
This Court_ has said that an unsatisfactory explanation
is one which is false, unreasonable or improbable,-while a
satisfactory explanation is one in which a jury of ordinary
-intelligence, discretion and caution may repose confidertce.
State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584, 591, 126 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1942).
The burden on the defendant is to explain his possession.

If he is innocent of any wrondoing, then his explanation will
be reasonable and satisfactory.

See State v. Eastmond, 28

Utah 2d 129, 133, 499 P.2d 276, 2?9 (1972).

To say, however,

that the burden of producing a satisfactory explanation rests
on the defendant is misleading, because the permissive
presumption "need not be rebutted by affirmative proof or
· affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by any evidence or
lack of evidence in the case."

Ulster County Court v. Allen,

supra, at 161 n. 20.
Appellant makes the untenable argument that a
defendant may offer any explanation of his possession and
that explanation will be deemed satisfactory until specifically
rebutted by the prosecution.

This contention was rejected in

State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 642, 244 P.2d 653, 655 (1952),
where the Court said "[The] explanation, standing by itself,

-12-
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may be regarded as 'satisfactory.'

However, it is to be

measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances
and the other evidence in the case."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(1)

(1953, as amended),

does not require the prosecution to prove that a silent
defendant cannot offer a satisfactory explanation, State v.
Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 584 (Utah 1977), nor does it require
the prosecution to produce rebuttal evidence when a defendant
offers a vague, unreasonable and improbable explanation.
The Supreme Court in Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S. 837 (1973), said:
. • • the mere fact that there is some
evidence tending to explain the defendant's
possession consistent with innocence
a fact not present in the instant case,
• . • does not bar instructing the jury
on the inference. The jury must weigh
the explanation to determine whether it
is 'satisfactory' . . . The jury is not
bound to accept or believe any particular
explanation any more than it is bound to
accept the correctness of the inference.
Id. at 845, n. 9, (emphasis added).
Since the jury is free to reject any explanation offered by
a defendant in light of the evidence adduced at trial, it
necessarily follows that there is no burden on the prosecution
to produce additional evidence in rebuttal.
Upon completion of the prosecution's case, appellant
offered a fanciful tale of mystery hitch-hikers who clandestinely
delivered a vehicle to his storage shed.

To aid the jury, the
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prosecution highlighted several inconsistencies between
this tale and the evidence.
Appellant testified that these mystery men called
him at 6:00-6:30 p.m., on the night of the theft, to say
they had the parts he wanted,

(T. 76), but the vehicle was

not out of the victim's possession until 8:00-8:30 p.m.
(T. 95).

The mystery men had offered to sell the parts·to

appellant, but they never returned to be paid for them (T. 80).
Appellant testified that he thought he could remove the
desired auto parts because the car looked "beat up" and like
a "junk heap"

(T. 77), but when appellant was shown photos

of the car at trial, he acknowledged that the vehicle did not
look "beat up"

(T. 78).

The prosecution also pointed out

that a camera, cassette tapes and check book were in plain
view on the floor of the vehicle, suggesting that it was

unreasonable to believe the vehicle was old and abandoned (T. 97
Finally, the parts were supposedly needed to repair appellant's
sister's mustang (T. 68), but appellant's sister was not
called to corroborate this.

The jury evaluated this expla-

nation in light of the evidence adduced at trial and rejected
it as unsatisfactory.
D

WHEN THE INSTRUCTION IS CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE CHARGE,
THE JURY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MISLED.
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A permissive presumption does not shift the
burden of proof.

Even if we assume that there was some

error in the wording of the instruction, any harmful affect
was eliminated by the rest of the charge.
In State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d

517, 520

(1968), this Court said:
If [the instructions] are looked at all
together as they should be, the issues
to be determined were stated to the jury
in a clear and understandable manner.
The trial judge adequately explained to
them the elements of both [crimes] as
defined in our penal code, and that they
must find each and all of them beyond a
reasonable doubt before they could render
the verdict of guilty.

Accord, State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777, 779 (Utah 1979); State
v. Burch, 17 Utah 2d 418, 419, 413 P.2d 805, 807 (1966).
In the instant case the jury was clearly instructed
regarding the elements of theft as defined in our criminal
code (Instruction #8, R. 49).

The jury was further instructed

that it must presume the innocence of the defendant and that
it may not find the defendant guilty of the crime charged
until the prosecution has proved guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.

(Instructions #7, #10, R. 48, 50).

When looked at as

a whole, the ·charge properly instructed the jury on the elements
of the crime of theft and on the burden of proof which the
prosecution must meet.

-15-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL INTENT.
The jury was instructed that in order to find
appellant guilty, they must find that each of five elements
has been proved beyond a reasonble doubt.

The fourth

element required that the defendant:
4. Did commit the offense of theft,
in that he did obtain or exercise unauthorized
control over the property of another, to-wit,
an automobile in operable condition, with
the purpose to deprive the owner therec:>I:""
(R.49, emphasis added.)
This is a nearly verbatim statement of the language in
the Utah theft state, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953,
as amended) .
It would seem to be unnecessary to point out
that the phrase· "obtain or exercise unauthorized control
over the property of another" constitutes the actus reus
of theft; the proscribed conduct, and that the phrase
"with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof" constitutes
the requisite mens rea or criminal intent.

Appellant,

however, argues that the underlined portion of element
4 does not relate to intent, but somehow further defines
the physical act.

Appellant hypothesizes that "a person

purchasing merchand1se in a store has the purpose to deprive
the owner of the property under the definition stated at

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

76-6-401(3) but still lacks criminal intent."
at 7).

(App. Brief

Appellant fails to consider that once an agreed

upon exchange, i.e. sale, has taken place, the purchaser
is the owner of the property.

The three definitions of

"purpose to deprive" found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3)
(1953, as amended), all contain an element of loss or injury
to the owner.

No reasonable construction of the theft

statute could lead to the conclusion drawn by appellant.
Appellant asserts that "nothing in the statutory
definition of "purpose to deprive" requires that the
defendant know that he has no right to withhold the
property from the owner, or know that his taking is
wrongful."

(App. Brief at 7).

Appellant wants this Court

to believe that he may obtain unauthorized possession of
the property of another with the intent to benefit thereby
to the detriment of the true owner, and yet, not realize
that his taking is wrong.

Such a position is palpably .

untenable.
That the instant statute and instruction say
"purpose to deprive" instead of "intent to deprive" does
not remove the element of intent from the consideration
of the jury.

Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition,

at 1400, defines "purpose" as "an end, intention, or aim."
It further defines "intent" as "purpose, signification,
intendment," and "intention" as "will, purpose, design."
Id. at 947.

Ballantine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition,
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at 1028, defines
as "purpose.

11

purpose 11 as

11

That which is intended," and

"with fixed purpose, Noun: purpose.
11

11

an intention 11 and

11

11

intention 11

intent 11 as

Id. at 646.

That

intent" and "intention" are synonymous, see Words and

Phrases, Perm. Ed. Vol. 22, at 12, 22-23.

This Cou.rt has

frequently held that "purpose to deprive 11 constitutes
the mens rea element of the crime of theft.

E.g., State.v.

Norman Laine, No. 16768, decided September 12, 1980;
State v. Smith, 571 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah 1977).
Appellant made no objection to Instruction #13
at trial, but now attempts to attack the instructionon appeal alleging two deficiencies.

Under Utah R. Civ.

·p., Rule 51, appellant may not assign error to an
instruction which he took no exception to.

State v.

International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977);
_Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, 529, 69 P.2d 969, 971 (1937).
Valid state interests are promoted by adherence to the
rule; consequently, it should be rarely circumvented.
State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1976);

State v.

Carter, 27 Utah 2d 416, 418, 497 P.2d 26, 27 (1972).
Rule 51, however, does allow the reviewing court,
in the interests of justice, to consider the giving of
or failure to give an instruction where no objection was
made.

This Court has exercised this power where the

error has amounted to a denial of due process.
Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 204, 205, 494 P.2d 285.

2A~

State v.
r1a,~'
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-

see State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 101, 60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936).
In the interests of justice, the state will respond
to the alleged deficiencies improperly raised by appellant
and to an issue presented in Instruction #13 which appellant
has not addressed.
Appellant acknowledges that the instructions are
to be read as a whole but fails to do just that.

Appellant

first alleges that Instruction #13 (R. 52) , fails to
instruct the jury that the state must prove intent beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The jury was so instructed in Instruction

Nos. 7, 8 and 10 (R.48,49,50).

Second, that Instruction

#13 fails to require that the requisite criminal intent
exist at the time of the taking.

Instruction #8 states

that defendant must "obtain control •
to deprive."

(Emphasis added.)

with the purpose

When the instructions are

read as a whole, State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 276, 444
P.2d 517, 520 (1968), there is no error.
Appellant further attempts to argue that
Instruction #13 was improper based upon State v. Smith,
571 P.2d 578 {Utah 1977), in which the defendant was charged
with issuing a bad check and theft by deception.

Appellant

misstated the facts of that case when he said the defendant
ultimately intended to honor the check he uttered in exchange
for a deed {App. Brief at 9).

This Court found that

defendant uttered a check for $32,453 on an account whose
-19-
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balance never exceeded $1,045 and which was overdrawn at
that time by $539.

This Court concluded that the funds

promised to cover the check were nonexistent.

In Smith,

the jury was instructed that to find defendant guilty of
theft by deception, they must find that the property was
intentionally and knowingly obtained and that i t was
obtained by deception and with the purpose to deprive
the true owners thereof.

This Court said, "[t]he jury

was properly instructed with regard to culpable mental
state."

Id. at 581.
An additional and apparently unnecessary

instruction, regarding mental state, was given in Smith.
·Instruction #12, therein, is nearly identical to
Instruction #13 given in the instant case, Defendant
~mith

argued that the instruction had the effect of

presuming intent from the act.

This Court found no error

in the giving of Instruction #12 and said that i t is
mer~ly

a statement that "ignorance of the law is no

defense."

Id. at 580-581.
Appellant attempts to argue that Instruction

#13 is improper in this case because the issue,
herein, is a mistake of fact, while in Smith, the issue
was a mistake of law (App. Brief at 9).

Appellant has

failed to discern the real issue raised by Instruction #13.
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The specific problem with Instruction #13 is that it defines
general criminal intent, while the crime of theft requires
a specific criminal intent.

The argument to be made is that

the jury might convict upon finding general intent, i.e.,
that defendant intentionally did that which the law declares
to be a crime, even though he may not know that his actions
are unlawful.

The crime of theft however, requires the

specific intent of, "with the purpose to deprive the owner
thereof."

It appears that neither party in State v. Smith,

supra, adequately presented this issue to the Court.
The California courts have held that giving the
irrelevant general intent instruction is error, but not
necessarily prejudicial error.

For example, in People v.

Butcher, 345 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1959), the defendant was charged
with rape, robbery and burglary.

The jury was instructed on

both general and specific criminal intent but was not instructed
as to which intent was required for each crime.

The court

found that where the only real evidence was uncontradicted
by the defendant, the evidence was so conclusive that the
error did not influence the verdict.

Id. at 134.

In the

instant case, the state's evidence was essentially uncontradicted.
The only evidence presented by appellant was the patently
unbelievable tale he told in court.
rejected this tale as

fa~se,

When the jury properly

the only evidence to be considered

-21-
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was the state's case in chief.
In People v. Booth, 243 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1952},
the jury was instructed on general criminal intent and on
the specific intent _required for the crime of lewd and
lascivious acts with a child under 14.

This error-was

found to be non-prejudicial where the acts were "such _as
-to preclude the belief they were committed without criminal
intent."

Id. at 874.

In the instant case, appellant was

found in possession of recently stolen property, under
circumstances suggesting that he was attempting to conceal
that property from view while he secured the fruits of the
crime

(T. 58}.

At the time of his arrest appellant made

an incriminating statement,

(T. 42}, and at trial he gave

an unreasonable and unbelievable explanation of his possession
of the stolen property.

These actions are wholly inconsistent

with innocence, and preclude any belief that they were
committed without criminal intent.
In~truction

It was error to give

#13, in the instant case, because that instruction

was irrelevant to the matter to be considered by the jury.
But that error has not prejudiced appellant and therefore
does not warrant reversal of his conviction.

Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure, Rule 30; see also, State v. Villiard,
27 Utah 2d 204, 205, 494 P.2d 285, 286 (1972}.
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POINT I I I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON APPELLANT'S THEORY
OF THE CASE.
Appellant correctly states that in order to receive
an instruction based upon the statutory defenses found in
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402(3}

(1953, as amended}, he must

present evidence which is consistent with the legislative
intent embodied in the statute.
however, is of secondary concern.

The focus of the evidence,
The real question is whether

appellant has presented substantial evidence to support his
theory.

State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1390 (Utah 1977};

State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 564, 144 P.2d 290, 292 (1943}.
This Court set the standard in State v. Castillo,
23 Utah 2d 70, 72, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (1969}:
If the defendant's evidence, although in
material conflict with the state's proof, be
such that the jury may entertain a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not he acted in selfdefense, he is entitled to have the jury
instructed • . • [on that theory]. Conversely,
if all reasonable men must conclude that the
evidence is so slight as to be incapable of
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind
as to whether a defendant accused of a crime
acted in self-defense, tendered instructions
thereon are properly refused.
Appellant's fanciful tale, presented at trial, is
nothing more than a self-serving fiction, totally devoid of
substance or corroborating facts.

Appellant attempts to find

corroboration in the testimony of Wayne Pasco (App. Brief at

-23-
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15).

When asked if he got close enough to identify the

two men at the storage shed, Mr. Pasco testified, "I.got
at one point within 20 or 30 feet, but being near 11:30
[p.m.], it was very dark."

(T.51).

It requires a rather

tortured reading of Mr. Pasco's testimony to conclude
that it somehow supports the story of appellant.

In

State v. Talarico, 57 Utah 229, 234, 193 P. 860, 861
(1920), this Court said:

"While the theory of counsel,

persistently and strenuously urged, was that of selfdefense, it was nevertheless all theory and no evidence,
all shadow and no substance."
is nothing more than shadow.

Appellant's story, herein,
A spectre of the truth.

Even if the trial court had erred in refusing
to give the requested instruction, that error would have
been harmless.
~he

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30.

instructions, when read as a whole, require the jury

to consider the testimony of appellant in reaching its
verdict.
Instruction #2 (R. 43) , instructed the jury to
"weigh and consider all of the evidence and circumstances
shown by the evidence," in arriving at a verdict.

Instruc-

tion #4 (R. 45) , informed the jury that the defendant is
a competent witness and that his testimony should be weighed
the same as that of any other witness.

Instruction #11

(R.51), required the jury to impartially consider and
compare all of the evidence.

Instruction

~7

in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24-

required the jury to find appellant not guilty so long as a
reasonable doubt exists.

See State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386,

1390 (Utah 1977).
The trial court properly refused to instruct the
jury on the appellant's theory of the case.

If this ruling

was error, appellant was not substantially prejudiced since
the jury heard and considered his testimony in reaching a
verdict.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE A PORTION OF THE POLICE REPORT
IN ORDER TO REHABILITATE THE CHALLENGED
TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY LEONARD.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence the following portion of a police
report prepared by Deputy Esplin who recorded the information
relayed by Deputy Leonard:
Deputy Esplin then took charge of the
case and Deputy Leonard talked to the
individual, Doug Asay, who had already been
advised of his rights and was asked if the
vehicle had been stolen, at which time Mr.
Asay admitted that the vehicle had been
stolen (T.91).
Appellant's hearsay objection to this evidence was overruled
at trial.
In order to be hearsay, the admitted portion of
the police report must have been offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the statement made.

The report was not

offered to prove that the car was stolen, but to show that
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Deputy Leonard reported that such a
-25-

statement had been made by the appellant.

The report relayed

information, based on the personal knowledge and observations
of Deputy Leonard, that the statement was made, without regard
to its being true or false.

See State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d

198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957).
Even if the prior consistent statement was found
to be hearsay, it was, nevertheless, admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule.

Utah R. Evid. 66, makes

admissible hearsay within hearsay, where each level of hearsay
is itself admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.
The two levels of hearsay in this case would be (1) the
prior consistent statement of Deputy Leonard, and (2) the
·police report prepared by Deputy Esplin.
As for Deputy Leonard's prior consistent statement,
Utah R. Evid. 63(1) (c), makes admissible a prior statement of
.a witness where "it will support testimony made by the witness
in the present case when such testimony has been challenged."
Deputy Leonard testified at trial that, at the time
of arrest, appellant said "that the vehicle was stolen"
(T.42).

Appellant attempted to challenge this statement on

cross-examination and through the testimony of a Mr. Carlson,
asserting that a few nights before trial, Deputy Leonard told
Mr. Carlson that at the time of arrest, appellant "made no
statements to him whatsoever"

(T.86).

Where a witness'

testimony has been so challenged, prior statements of that
witness are admissible where they are cnnc:i

c+-~"".a..

--.! _._,_
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testimony at trial.
The police report is admissible under Utah R. Evid.
63(15) as the report of a public official, prepared within
the scope of his

dut~

to investigate the incident.

In

Barney v. Cox, 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978), apparently the
only case in which this Court has addressed the scope of
Rule 63(15), the Court suggested that a computer printout
of a driver's accumulated point totals may be admissible
under Rule 63(15), as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 698.

A computer printout presents the possibility,

not present in the instant case, of a programming error when
the information is typed into the computer.

In this case,

however, Deputy Esplin made the report at the time of the
arrest and Deputy Leonard was available at trial, to be
cross-examined as to the accuracy of the statement he heard
and relayed to Deputy Esplin.
If the prior consistent statement had been offered
to prove the truth of the matter stated therein, it would
have been admissible for the reason that both the statement
and the police report were individually admissible under
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Since this prior statement was not hearsay, the
real issue is

whether~

the trial court properly allowed the

state's witness' testimony to be bolstered by prior
consistent statements.
-27-
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The rule in Utah is that prior consistent statements
are admissible where credibility has been attacked through
introduction of prior inconsistent statements.

See Utah

R. Evid. 20.
In State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d. 861.
(1948), a first degree murder case, the testifying medical
examiner was cross-examined regarding alleged inconsistencies
in his previous statements.

The trial court refused to admit

into evidence the full autopsy report prepared by that
individual, but did allow a portion of the report to be
read into evidence.

This court found that the portion read,

was consistent with the witness' testimony at trial and
·admissible.
In the instant case, the trial court admitted into
evidence only that portion of the police report which went
to Deputy Leonard's challenged testimony. That portion was
consistent with his testimony at trial and was properly
admitted.
In State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388
(1957), involving the offense of robbery, a state's witness
was cross-examined regarding prior inconsistent statements.
In order to rehabilitate the witness, a police officer was
allowed to testify to a prior statement of the witness,
essentially consistent with the witness' testimony at trial,
which had been made to that officer.
-28-

This Court said:
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"We

think the better view is that where there has been an
attempt to impeach or discredit a witness, prior statements
consistent with his present testimony may be offered to off set
the impeachment."

Id. at 391.

The Court found the prior

statements to be relevant to credibility and therefore of
aid to the jury. in arriving at the truth.

The case was,

however, reversed and remanded on other grounds.
In the instant case, Deputy Leonard's testimony
was discredited through evidence of an alleged prior
inconsistent statement.

The trial court properly admitted

into evidence that portion of the report which was relevant
to Deputy Leonard's credibility and which was consistent with
his testimony at trial.
POINT V
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THE APPELLk~T GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
It is well established in Utah that in order for
a convicted defendant to succeed in challenging on appeal
the sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial, he must establish that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime.

State v. Daniels,

584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah

-29-
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1977); State v. Jones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976).

Those

cases also establish that in considering a claim of -insufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must assume that
the trier of fact believed those aspects of the evidence and
drew such reasonable inferences therefrom as support the
yerdict.
Appellant correctly points out that mere possession
of recently stolen property, when not coupled with other
culpatory or incriminating facts, does not alone justify a
conviction.
In State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 P. 247 (1931),
this Court said: "[p]ossession of articles recently stolen,
when coupled with circumstances of hiding or concealing them,
or of disposing or attempting to dispose of them, or of making
false or unreasonable or unsatisfactory explanations of the
·possession, may be sufficient to connect the possessor with
the conunission of the offense."

Id. at 249.

Accord, State v.

Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952).
In the instant case, while dismantlinq the vehicle,
appellant attempted to conceal it from view by opening the
shed door just a couple of feet and parking his truck in
front of the door (T. 58).

Appellant was, in a sense, disposin

of the vehicle by removing the parts that he wanted (T. 36,56}.
Finally, appellant presented a patently unbelievable story
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at trial.
In State v. Heath, 27 Utah 2d 13, 492 P.2d 978
(1972), the Court said "[i]n addition to the . . . possession
by the defendant, there must be proof of corroborating circumstances tending of themselves to show guilt.

Such corroborating

circumstances may consist of the acts, conduct, falsehoods,
if any, or other declarations, if any, of the defendant which
tend to show his guilt."

Id. at 979.

In the instant case, when appellant was first confronted at the storage shed by the police, he stated the car
was his and that he had a bill of sale at home.

When asked

if the police could accompany appellant to his home to see
the bill of sale, appellant became very evasive.

(T. 36-38).

Appellant basically conceded that his conduct at the time
of arrest implied guilt (App. Brief at 30).

These corroborating

facts tend to show guilt and when considered in conjunction
with appellant's possession of the stolen vehicle, are sufficient to support his conviction.

See State v. Sessions, 583

P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1978).
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence
in two ways.

First, appellant relies on dicta in State v.

Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976), to suggest that where the
case is based on circumstantial evidence, "the circumstances
must reasonably preclude every reasonable hypothesis of

-31-
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defendant's innocence . . . "

Id. at 219.

It is unclear

how much, if at all, this increases the burden of the
prosecution.

In any event; the

uncontrovert~ble

evidence

presented, herein, by the prosecution, appellant's admission
at the time of arrest and the unbelievable story he told
in court, preclude any reasonable belief in his innocence.
Second, appellant attempts to argue that the
evidence never showed that he was in possession of an operable
motor vehicle as he was charged in the complaint (App. Brief
at 28) .

Appellant argues that when he was first found in

possession of the vehicle, on the afternoon of July 11, 1979,
it was not operable.

Once the jury rejected appellant's

explanation as false, they could reasonably find that he was
one of the two individuals who delivered the vehicle to his
storage shed on the night of July 10, 1979, and that the auto
- was not operable the next day when the police confronted him
because he was in the process of dismantling it.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that reasonable
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt about his guilt.
State v. Daniels, supra; State v. Wilson, supra; State v. Jones
supra.
CONCLUSION
The permissive presumption found in § 76-6-402(1)
does not shift the burden of proof to the appellant.
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It may,

however, require that the appellant came forward with
evidence consistent with innocence.
The jury was properly instructed as to the intent
required for the offense of theft.

Instruction #8 recited

the language of § 76-6-401(3) regarding criminal intent.
The general intent instruction was irrelevant to the issue
to be decided by the jury, but under the circumstances of
this case, the appellant was not prejudiced.
Appellant was not entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case because he presented
no credible evidence to support that theory.
The portion of the police report admitted in evidence
was admissible to bolster the discredited testimony of Deputy
Leonard.

Even if that report was hearsay, it was admissible

as an exception to the hearsay rule, to rehabilitate the
witness' challenged testimony.
The prosecution proved that appellant was in possession

of recently stolen property and that his expla-

nation of that possession was unsatisfactory.

Appellant

has failed to show that reasonable minds must have entertained
some doubt as to his guilt.
support the conviction.

The evidence was sufficient to

The judgment of the Second Judicial
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District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully

su~mitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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